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I. Introduction
How different is Emmerich de Vattel's eighteenth century
I EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (Joseph
Chitty ed., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1859) (1758).
t J.D. Candidate, UNC School of Law, 2012. I am forever grateful to Professors Alfred
Brophy and Jon McClanahan for their guidance and encouragement. I appreciate the
perseverance and diligence of Adam Batenhorst and the N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
staff for their work to improve this article. I dedicate this endeavor to my husband and
my children who give up our precious time together for what often seems just another
step in an endless journey.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
"Family of Nations" from modem global society? Those nations
also shared a common space, depended on a limited supply of
natural resources, and relied on the comity and grace of neighbors
to resolve potential conflicts and handle diplomatic issues.
Similarly, they were forced to contend with rogue, dishonest
sovereigns occasionally wreaking havoc. Vattel's 1758 treatise
outlined the principles of mutual respect and equal dignity of
sovereigns relied on by his Family of Nations to address these
issues.2 In the twenty-first century, modem customary
international law ("CIL")' likewise embodies the uncodified,
guiding principles undergirding international law.
Broadly applied principles like CIL raise not only procedural
questions but also substantive ones. How does a global society,
comprised of hundreds of autonomous sovereigns, agree on the
rules to which it will be bound? Is CIL still relevant or has it
become superfluous, or perhaps even obsolete, in modem
international society? What happens when one of these sovereigns
decides it no longer wishes to abide by a rule of CIL? Can it
merely "opt out"? As CIL establishes the parameters for actions
ranging from sovereign immunity to contracts to principles of war,
"opting out" potentially has dramatic implications.'
Recently, Curtis Bradley and Mitu Gulati initiated an ongoing
academic discourse in the Yale Law Journal with their article
Withdrawing from International Custom ("Withdrawing").'
Withdrawing proposed a revision of CIL protocol, which would
allow a country to opt out of a particular aspect of CIL
2 See id. ch. III § 47.
3 See Curtis A. Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International
Custom, 120 YALE L. J. 202, 209 n.22 (2010) [hereinafter Withdrawing] (citing two
definitions of CIL: "the law of the intemational community that 'results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation"'
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987)) and "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law" (citing STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031)).
4 See generally David Luban, Opting Out of the Law of War: Comments on
Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. ONuNE 151 (2010) (providing
specific examples of the negative implications of the adoption of the proposed "Default
View" to the Law of War).
5 Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 423.
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unilaterally, upon giving notice to the international community.'
Bradley and Gulati argued this revision, the "Default View," was
merely a return to the model of international law espoused by
treatise authors and jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.' They questioned the wisdom of the compulsory
implementation of CIL, the "Mandatory View,"' in the twenty-
first century.' Their initial, broad proposal accomplished its
objective to "begin a discussion about why the Mandatory View
developed and whether, for some categories of CIL, a Default
View might be more appropriate."o Other authors responded by
challenging this proposal on a myriad of topics such as the law of
war, contracts, treaties, and historical accuracy." Emphasizing the
6 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 207.
7 See id at 206 ("[A] number of prominent international law publicists of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thought that CIL rules were at least sometimes
subject to unilateral withdrawal. This was also the view of the early U.S. Supreme Court
in some of its most famous CIL decisions."). But see William S. Dodge, Withdrawing
from Customary International Law: Some Lessons from History, 120 YALF L.J. ONLINE
169, 170 (2010) ("[T]he Default View has never been the predominant understanding of
customary international law.").
8 Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 202. Bradley and Gulati define the "Mandatory
View" as "the conventional wisdom . . . that nations never have the legal right to
withdraw unilaterally from the unwritten rules of customary international law . . . ." Id
See also MICHAEL BARKUN, LAW WITHOUT SANCTIONS: ORDER IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES
AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 68 (1968) (discussing the origins of the "prevalent belief
that international law must be globally valid-the sharing of norms across state
boundaries is not enough.").
9 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 207-08. Bradley & Gulati contend that
despite the lack of clarity in the manner of CIL formation, once a rule has 'formed' all
nations are thus bound to adhere to the rule unless they fall under the persistent objector
doctrine. Id. at 210-11; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Customary
International law and Withdrawal Rights in an Age of Treaties, 21 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2010) [hereinafter Age of Treaties] (claiming CIL is "riddled with
uncertainty" and questioning the wisdom of legally obligating nations to comply with
CIL if it is unclear how the "belief arise[s] in the first place"). But see Samuel
Estreicher, A Post-formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary International Law?:
Some Cautionary Notes, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 57, 58 (2010) (noting the stability
of CIL).
10 Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 275.
11 See generally Lea Brilmayer & Isaias Yemane Tesfalidet, Treaty Denunciation
and "Withdrawal" from Customary International Law: An Erroneous Analogy with
Dangerous Consequences, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 217 (2011) (claiming a "serious
distortion" in Withdrawing of the law surrounding international agreements "which does
not in fact grant a right of unilateral withdrawal"); Dodge, supra note 7 (arguing the
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purpose of their original article and answering the issues raised by
their colleagues, Bradley and Gulati subsequently published
Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can Customary
International Law Be Improved? ("Mandatory").12
After considering the arguments of several respondents, this
article continues to question the wisdom of Bradley and Gulati's
proposed opt out rule. Adding to the ongoing discourse, this
article offers a more expansive view of the historical foundation of
CIL, revisits Supreme Court decisions applying CIL, and advances
the normative argument of returning to the principles and model of
CIL espoused by Vattel.
Part II examines theories of CIL prior to Vattel, followed by an
in-depth review of his multi-faceted conception of CIL. As
Bradley and Gulati recognized, the history of CIL is the
appropriate starting point for evaluating any proposition for
change.' 3  Bradley and Gulati continue to argue the Mandatory
View "was not always the canonical understanding of CIL."l4
Nonetheless, others challenge this arguably erroneous depiction of
Vattel's endorsement of the Default View.'
history of CIL is incorrectly portrayed in Withdrawing); Luban, supra note 4 (discussing
the implications of Bradley and Gulati's proposal to the Law of War); Christina Ochoa,
Disintegrating Customary International Law: Reactions to Withdrawing from
International Custom, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 157 (2010) (responding to the
analogies in Withdrawing to contracts); Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(B)? A
Reply to Bradley & Gulati, 21 DUKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 173 (2010) (criticizing Bradley
& Gulati's interpretation of the law surrounding treaties).
12 Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Mandatory Versus Default Rules: How Can
Customary International Law Be Improved?, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 421, 423 (2011)
[hereinafter Mandatory].
13 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 208-09. Bradley and Gulati began
Withdrawing by recounting the early history of CIL and introducing the Law of Nations,
designed to regulate both public and private international law, as the precursor to the
modem CIL and regulator of "[the] rights of the seas, conduct during wartime, and
diplomatic immunity." Id. at 208.
14 Mandatory, supra note 12, at 422.
15 See Luban, supra note 4, at 153 (arguing "Bradley and Gulati's principal
historical source for the Default View, Emer de Vattel, never accepted that states can opt
out of the law of war."); see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 172 ("[Bradley and Gulati's]
account [of Vattel's model of international law] paints an incomplete picture"); Edward
T. Swaine, Bespoke Custom, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L LAW 207, 209-10 (2010) (stating
"Bradley and Gulati ... understate [the] significance [of voluntary law]" from which
countries could not opt out).
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Although Vattel recognized four manners in which CIL could
be formed, Bradley and Gulati's proposal minimized the
importance of the two methods inimical to their analysis.16
Instead, they emphasized custom to garner greater support for their
proposed Default View." CIL formed by custom allowed greater
flexibility to sovereigns, contrary to the alternative, more binding
manners used to form most international law.'" This narrow focus
on CIL created by custom, results in a historical analysis that is
overly restricted and ultimately flawed.
Part III of this article more extensively explores the integrated
components of history and philosophy that shaped international
law over the two centuries following Vattel's work. Similar to
their historical presentation of Vattel's treatise, Bradley and
Gulati's selected quotes from subsequent international law
treatises that do not adequately represent the overarching
sentiments or the historical context of the excerpted pieces." It is
from this limited vantage point that Bradley and Gulati frame their
analysis of CIL history and its "functional desirability."2 0 Part III
concludes by analyzing the impact of the integration of
"uncivilized" countries into the "civilized" Family of Nations and
the perceived shift from the Default View to the Mandatory View
of CIL.2'
16 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 217-18. Although Bradley and Gulati explain
that natural and voluntary law are only briefly recognized as alternate categories of
international law, the paragraph that follows the perfunctory reference begins, "[t]he key
point for present purposes is that Vattel and other classic publicists thought that nations
could withdraw from at least some CIL rules." Id. at 218.
17 See discussion infra Part IV.B-D (recognizing treaties and voluntary law as
alternate categories of international law).
18 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 216-17; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 173;
Luban, supra note 4, at 158 ("The only rules of customary international law to which
Vattel applies the Default View are those that are 'indifferent in themselves'-customs
where the need for some default rule is evident but it does not much matter which of
several alternatives custom settles on.").
19 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 218-19.
20 See id at 215-26, 241-45. Dodge challenges the historical analysis presented in
Withdrawing contending the Old Mandatory View, based on natural law, was followed
by the Modern Mandatory View, which was also accepted by positivist scholars. See
Dodge, supra note 7, at 180-83.
21 See discussion infra Part II; see also BARKUN, supra note 8, at 68-69 ("[A]s long
as the tide of European power ran strong . . . [t]here was no boundary problem for
international law . . . except, perhaps, the dubious boundary between 'civilized' and
2012]1 851
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Relying on the work of legal historians to paint the changing
landscape of intellectual and moral thought, Part IV revisits
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting and applying
CIL.2 2 In Withdrawing, Bradley and Gulati cited a myriad of dicta
as "evidence" of the Court upholding a view contrary to the
modem understanding of CIL.23 In an attempt to provide a
panoramic vista, this response cites alternate portions of the same
opinions implying a view contrary to Bradley and Gulati's
proposal for unilateral withdrawal. Furthermore, Part IV includes
an analysis of Johnson v. M'Intosh24 to elucidate the disparity of
the Supreme Court's application of CIL between civilized nations
and between a civilized nation and an uncivilized nation.25
In light of this more comprehensive historical analysis, Part V
ultimately rejects the proposal to allow unilateral withdrawal from
CIL and advocates a return to Vattel's perspective of CIL.
Because CIL forms the "floor, not the ceiling" 26 of international
law, a "floor" comprised of guiding principles-grounded in
commonly shared human values-is essential. As our global
society returns to a Family of Nations, this article upholds these
guiding principles and rejects any myopic proposal that contradicts
the principles of mutual respect and the equal dignity of
sovereigns espoused by Vattel.2 7
'barbarism.' Now that the old colonial empires have shattered, non-Western cultural
influences have come to the fore . . . [and] there are very real boundaries to be
considered.").
22 See discussion infra Part IV.
23 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 219-26.
24 21 U.S. (8 Wheaton) 543 (1823).
25 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
26 Compare Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66, 120-122 (1825) (finding slavery legal under the Law of Nations even though
contrary to U.S. notions of morality), with President Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen
Points, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Jan. 8, 1918) (expressing the importance
of forming an international association to "afford[] mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.").
27 See Luban, supra note 4, at 163-66 (lamenting the possible ramifications of the
application of the Default View in the Law of War and concluding that "a system of law
in which you can divest yourself of legal obligations simply by announcing that
henceforth you are no longer bound is not really a system of law at all."); see also
Roberts, supra note 11, at 174 (stating that Bradley and Gulati's proposal is "problematic
given custom's function of protecting key structural and substantive norms in order to
best serve the interests of the international community.").
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II. Evolution of the Intellectual and Moral Conception
of CIL
"Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate
peace and harmony with all. "28
A. Conceptions of Customary International Law: Pre-Vattel
In the seventeenth century, two strains of thought dominated
the writings of scholars seeking to understand the sources of
natural law: Christianity and humanity.2 9 Samuel Pufendorf relied
on his Christian beliefs, emphasized the Golden Rule, and
advocated the equality of and freedom from subordination of
men.30 Committed to the superiority of a natural law derived
solely from God, Pufendorf rejected any form of positive law as
inferior and subordinate to the law of nature.3 1
A contemporary of Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius is considered "the
father of natural law."3 2 Whereas Pufendorf credited God as the
sole source of international law, Grotius also looked to the human
nature of man. He believed the two interactive properties that
govern human nature-"the desire for self-preservation and the
need for society"-also govern societies of men living together.3 4
28 George Washington, U.S. President, Farewell Address in THE INDEPENDENT
CHRONICLE, Sept. 26, 1796.
29 See Charles I. Reid, Originalism and Precedent: Judicial Precedent in the Late
Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: A Commentary on Chancellor Kent's
Commentaries, 5 AvE MARIA L. REv. 47, 58-60 (2007).
30 See GEORGE A. FINCH, THE SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17
(1937). "The natural state of man was one of peace rather than war" is the premise of
Samuel Pufendorf's treatise published in 1672, De Jure Naturae et Gentium. Id at 18
(quoting SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (1688)).
31 See id. at 18; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 180 (discussing Robert Phillimore,
who also credited "Divine Law" as the source of natural law).
32 Jon Miller, Hugo Grotius, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 28,
2011), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/grotius/#NatLaw (last visited Jan. 13, 2012)
(citing HAMILTON VREELAND, JR., HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE MODERN SCIENCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1917)); see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW I (3d ed.1999) ("Grotius' classic of 1625, The Law of War and
Peace, is widely acknowledged, more than any other work, as founding the modem
discipline of the law of nations . . . .").
33 WILLIAM FRANCIS ROEMER, THE ETHICAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 86
(Lawbook Exchange 2008) (1929).
34 See id.; see also HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1866).
Wheaton relates Grotius's sentiments that natural law was equivalent to the law of God
2012] 853
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Grotius wrote De Jure Belli ac Pacis35 in an effort to contain "the
brutal passions which inflame nations in war" finding such "lack
of restraint" to be something "even barbarous races should be
ashamed... ."36
Despite Pufendorf and Grotius, positivism began to take hold
in Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century under the
leadership of Dutch jurist, Cornelius van Bynkershoek."
Bynkershoek wrote three books at the turn of the century claiming
that "the true basis of the law of nations [is] . . . the common
consent of the nations expressed either in international custom or
in treaties."" Already, the on-going debate about the origin of
international law was raging in the civilized world with many
theorists finding it necessary to choose between the naturalist and
positivist theories.39
In the midst of the cacophony of ideas and cultures that
defined Europe ("civilized nations") in the 1700s, Vattel, a Swiss
author, emerged as one of the most prominent writers on the topic
of international law.4 0 Rather than align directly with the
naturalists or the positivists, Vattel's influential treatise divided
the formation of international law into two branches-the
"necessary" law of Nations and the "positive" law of Nations.4 1
The necessary law of Nations was grounded in the theoretically
"being the rule of conduct prescribed by Him to his rational creatures, and revealed by
the light of reasons, or the sacred scriptures." WHEATON, supra, at 4; see also ROEMER,
supra note 33, at 82 ("[Grotius] sought to construct a law of nations based upon an
authority which would not be subject to religion or morals-the human reason-which
should command the respect of all people in all time.").
35 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS (1625). Grotius wrote De Jure Belli
Pacis while exiled during the Thirty Years' War. Id.
36 FINCH, supra note 30, at 16 (quoting the prologue to HUGO GROTIUs, DE JURE
BELLI AC PACIS § 28 (1625)); see also ROEMER, supra note 33, at 95 ("Grotius' work
concludes with the proposition: 'In the very heat of war, the greatest security, and
expectation of divine support, must be the unabated desire and invariable prospect of
peace. . . .").
37 See FINCH, supra note 30, at 20.
38 Id.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 25; see also Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 219 n.68.
41 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. §§ 7, 27; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at
172.
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irrefutable principles of the "law of nature;"42 whereas, the
positive law of Nations required some form of consent for the
Sovereign to be bound.43 Vattel theorized that the enforcement
and binding nature of the law depended on the manner of
formation.4 4
B. Vattel's Necessary Law ofNations
Like Grotius, Vattel derived necessary law from the natural
law principles that define the very essence of the human race:
edicts from which one cannot escape anymore than one can escape
one's own humanity.45 Vattel upheld these as normative values to
guide sovereigns and bind them in their interactions with other
nations.46 Believing natural law to be "immutable," he saw the
"obligations . . . aris[ing] from it [to be] necessary and
indispensable, [to which] nations can neither make any
changes . . . by their conventions, dispense with it in their own
conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance
of it."47 Vattel viewed any treaties or agreements made between
sovereigns, or internal customs or policies that violated this natural
law, as inherently unlawful because a society cannot refute these
duties to mankind.4 8
According to Vattel, natural law required every state to meet
its own internal needs first.49  Nonetheles, Vattel immediately
followed this counsel of self-preservation with the moral and
physical obligation to contribute to general welfare of other states
42 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. §§ 7, 8.
43 See id. at prelim. § 27.
44 See id. at prelim. §§ 7, 27, 28.
45 See generally Miller, supra note 32 (discussing the principles of natural law); see
also supra notes 33-35 and corresponding text discussing Hugo Grotius.
46 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 5. In the introduction to his treatise,
Vattel reasoned that the simple act of joining a "civilized" society does not cause men to
cease to be men; therefore, as men are bound by the law of nature so too are the societies
formed by the compilation of such men. Id. "We must therefore apply to nations the
rules of the law of nature, in order to discover what their obligations are, and what their
rights [sic]: consequently, the law ofNations is originally no other than the law ofNature
applied to Nations." Id. at prelim. § 6 (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at prelim. § 9.
48 See id; see also Luban, supra note 4, at 156.
49 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. §§ 5-6.
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"lawfully, and consistently with justice and honour." 0 Similarly,
out of respect for the freedom and sovereign dignity of fellow
states, each state was duly obligated to leave its fellow states in
peace.' Vattel viewed natural law as giving each state the right to
be free from the imposition of the will of another state-even
though the only true enforcer of these natural laws was the
conscience of each nation.52 Vattel labeled these as "imperfect"
rights because such internal obligations did not inherently give
another nation the right to demand compliance. Only through
mutual agreement could nations bind each other, compel
compliance, and change an imperfect right into a "perfect" right.54
Human rights norms, jus cogens5 or preemptory norms, are a
modem example of the necessary law of nations. The Restatement
follows Vattel's logic, finding any "international law which
violates [human rights norms] .. . void."5 Human rights abuses
contradict the law of nature; thus, "nations can neither make any
changes in [human rights norms] by their conventions, dispense
with [them] in their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each
other from the observance of [them]."5 7 Like all natural law,
50 Id. at prelim. §§ 13-14 (emphasis in original).
51 Id. at prelim. §§ 15-16.
52 Id. at prelim. § 17; see also FINCH, supra note 30, at 26. Per Chancellor Kent,
Vattel's necessary law of nations "is termed by others the internal law of nations,
because it is obligatory upon them in point of conscience." FINCH, supra note 30, at 26.
53 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 17 (stating imperfect rights only give one
the right to request compliance); see also Swaine, supra note 15, at 209 ("imperfect
rules, from which states could withdraw, might also be thought of as customary . . .
perhaps labeled as traditional, soft law .... )
54 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 17 (stating perfect rights give one state
the right to compel another to fulfill an obligation); see also Swaine, supra note 15, at
209 ("Perfect obligations are the type of rights that give other states rights to demand
observance.").
55 JANIS, supra note 32, at 62. "Jus cogens is a norm thought to be so fundamental
that it even invalidates rules drawn from treaty or custom." Id. Jus cogens is translated
to English as "peremptory norm." Id
56 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702 (1987), cmt. (a)-(f) ([T]he recognized human rights norms that violate
international law include: "practic[ing], encourag[ing], or condon[ing] (a) genocide, (b)
slavery or slave trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, torture
or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, [or]
(f) systematic racial discrimination . . . .").
57 VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 17.
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however, it is only the conscience of each nation that prevents it
from doing so."
Because one sovereign has no authority over another to
prevent internal human rights abuses, provisions for the treatment
of wounded and sick soldiers and for the humanization of warfare
were necessarily codified by the four Geneva Conventions and
subsequently ratified by independent sovereigns.59 The Geneva
Conventions exemplify the process needed to convert an imperfect
right, the jus cogens norm to treat prisoners and victims of war
humanely, into a perfect right.60 Ratification binds all signatories
henceforth from violating this natural law and allows the
obligation to be lawfully compelled by other nations.
Vattel viewed the most constructive foreign policy as having a
foundation based in natural law.6 ' Nevertheless, he recognized
that a foreign policy built solely on natural law would be rejected
and scorned by the politicians of the eighteenth century.62
Pragmatically, he included positive law as another manner in
which international law could be created.63 Unlike natural law,
which looked to God or human nature as its source, the source of
all positive law was man. Positive law also allowed nations to
purposefully, through action or inaction, create laws that were
58 See supra notes 51, 53, and accompanying text.
59 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, The Geneva Conventions of
1949 and Their Additional Protocols, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-
customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm (last visited Jan.
13, 2012). The four Geneva Conventions form "the core of International Humanitarian
Law ..... Id. The original version adopted in 1864, was revised in 1906, 1929, and
1949. Id. The current version, adopted in the wake of World War II, has achieved
universal ratification. Id. The First Geneva Convention of 1949 covers the protection
and care for the wounded and sick of armed conflict on land. Id. The Second Geneva
Convention concerns the protection and care for "the wounded, sick and shipwrecked" of
armed conflict at sea. Id. The Third Geneva Convention relates to the treatment of
prisoners of war. Id. The Fourth Geneva Convention concerns the protection of
civilians in time of war. Id.
60 See Luban, supra note 4, at 163.
61 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at bk. I § § 1, 3 (believing a foundation in natural law
would innately guide sovereigns to enact laws that were mutually beneficial and
designed to promote the common good of all nations).
62 See id. at bk. II § 1. "The following maxims will appear very strange to cabinet
politicians . . . the doctrine of this chapter will be a subject of ridicule." Id
63 See Dodge, supra note 7, at 172-75 (discussing Vattel's theory of natural and
positive law).
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equally and mutually compelling on fellow sovereigns.64 The
"Law of Nations," frequently quoted by Chief Justice John
Marshall and later known as Customary International Law, was
formed by both Vattel's positive law of nations and necessary law
of nations.6 5
C. Vattel's Positive Law ofNations
According to Vattel, the positive law of Nations was created in
one of three ways: universal voluntary law, conventional law, or
customary law.66 Universal voluntary law was "presumed ... [to
be] so fundamental as to be more or less automatically a part of
international law." 67  Conventional law was formed by "explicit,
usually written, agreements that states made among themselves." 68
Finally, customary law was created by the repeated and relied
upon practices of the individual sovereigns that composed the
Family of Nations and the sense of obligation felt by those nations
to follow it.69
While each of these methods required some form of consent on
64 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 27.
65 See, e.g., The Antelope 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825); see also Dodge, supra
note 7, at 175-79 (examining the Supreme Court's application of CIL in "Early
American Cases").
66 VATTEL, supra note 1, prelim. § 27. But see Dodge, supra note 7, at 172-75.
Dodge recognizes the confusion of the word "voluntary" "because it suggested an
optional character that Vattel expressly denied." Id at 172. Nevertheless, Dodge
ultimately categorizes voluntary law under Bradley and Gulati's perception of mandatory
law. Id. at 173.
67 JANIS, supra note 32, at 5. Universal voluntary law is the functional equivalent
of what modem international law deems "general principles of law." Id. These are
"nontreaty, noncustomary source[s] of international law.... The basic notion is that a
general principle of law is some proposition of law so fundamental that it will be found
in virtually every legal system." Id. at 55.
68 Id. at 5.
69 See id This customary practice "has municipal analogies in commercial law
notions such as 'the course of dealing' and 'the usage of trade' where practice creates
justifiable expectations of future observance." Id. Another important element of modern
customary law is the "psychological" aspect of opinio juris that "transforms the nitty-
gritty of a historical rendition of examples of state practice into .. . a rule of customary
international law." Id. at 46. "Without opiniojuris there may exist only a history lesson
more or less devoid of any significance." Id.; see also Luban, supra note 4, at 166
(citing Gerald Postema's description of customs as "commons" which Luban expounds
upon as being "maintained by participation . .. [which] carries normative force.").
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the part of the sovereign, focusing on the word "voluntary" in
universal voluntary law is misleading because it was the one form
of positive law for which consent was already presumed.70 Rather,
focusing on the word "universal" allows Vattel's meaning to
become evident-as it was the consistent, uniform practice of all
nations, or the general utility of the rule itself, on which the
presumption of consent was based." For example, the
commitment of all sovereign states to the safety and welfare of its
citizens created the universal voluntary law that gave a sovereign
state the right to repress any conduct that threatened this
commitment.7 2 Vattel wisely cautioned that universal voluntary
law must be necessarily circumscribed and carefully monitored to
avoid any extension that threatened the freedom or independence
of another sovereign nation.73
Conventional law, formed by express agreement through
treaties, bound only those parties that expressly consented to be
bound.74 Emphasizing the distinction between universal laws
(naturally governing all nations) and conventional laws (particular
to the nations that expressly adopted them) Vattel wrote: "As it is
evident that a treaty binds none but the contracting parties, the
conventional law of nations is not a universal law but a particular
law."" Vattel viewed the role of the Law of Nations as very
confined with regard to conventional law because the sovereigns
that constructed the treaties also stipulated the parameters for
entrance, exit, observance, and violation.76
Customary law evolved from "the tacit consent of, or ... the
70 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 21; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 172-
73.
71 See VATTEL, supra note I at prelim. § 21 n.7.
72 See id. at prelim. § 22.
73 See id at prelim. §23.
74 See id at prelim. § 24; see also JANIS, supra note 32, at 9. Conventional law
remains the "first and plainest source of international law." JANIS, supra note 32, at 9.
Generally, these express agreements are often referred to as treaties, but conventions,
pacts, protocols, and accords are also forms of conventional law. Id. The written
agreements "create legal rights and duties" and "the phrase pacta sunt servanda . . .
express[es] the fundamental principle that agreements, even between sovereign states,
are to be respected." Id.
75 VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 24.
76 See id.
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tacit convention of the nations that observe it towards each
other. . . ."n Vattel viewed customary law as limited to those
nations whose geographic proximity or frequent interactions
adequately exposed them to the custom and provided ample
opportunity to object to being bound.78 This distinction was
important because, once established, nations that "ha[d] not
expressly declared their resolution of not observing it in the
future" were "considered as having given their consent to it,
and [were] bound to observe it . . . ."" Although customary law
continues to be the most enigmatic mode of formation, it must
conform with natural law's principles of justice, honor, and
lawfulness. 0
D. Bradley and Gulati on Vattel
In Withdrawing, Bradley and Gulati quickly dispensed with
Vattel's three initial methods of formation (natural, universal
voluntary, and conventional) and instead chose to ground the
historical premise of their thesis solely in the final manner,
custom.8 ' While it is uncontested that Vattel viewed customary
law as one manner for creating CIL, the importance Vattel placed
on the foundational role of natural law and voluntary law is utterly
lost in their analysis.8 2 Furthermore, deemphasizing Vattel's
77 Id. at prelim. § 25 (emphasis added). Vattel defined customary law as "certain
maxim and customs consecrated by long use, and observed by nations in their mutual
intercourse with each other as a kind of law." Id.
78 See id. at prelim. § 26.
79 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 26
80 Id.; see also, JANIS, supra note 32, at 46. The uniform practice of states should
be consistent, but there are no specific requirements that it also be unanimous or ancient.
Id. at 46. The essential element that must be present is the "sense of legal obligation."
Id. This sense of legal obligation, opinio juris, was documented in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases heard before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1969. Id
The ICJ held: "The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to
what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts
is not itself enough." Id. (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Neth.)
1968 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Apr. 26)).
81 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 217-18; see also supra text accompanying
note 17.
82 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 6, n.2 (touting necessary law as
"immutable [and that which] ought to be the basis of the positive law of nations"); see
also Swaine, supra note 15, at 209 (claiming that Vattel "states were not free to opt out"
of voluntary law).
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conventional law as a vehicle used to create CIL and depicting
treaties solely as a means to escape the Mandatory View results in
a skewed perspective of Vattel's theory." Responding to criticism
of this analysis, Bradley and Gulati clarified the "principal goal [of
their historical analysis] . . . was to establish that the Mandatory
View was not always the exclusive understanding of how CIL
operates."84 Nonetheless, since Bradley and Gulati chose Vattel's
work as a model of the Default View, an accurate understanding of
his conceptualization of international law formation is arguably
necessary before considering his impact on the development of
international law jurisprudence.
This unbalanced perspective merits clarification, as Mandatory
(Bradley and Gulati's response) repeats the arguments advanced in
Withdrawing and uses the same quote as evidence of Vattel's
endorsement of the Default View:
However, if any of them happens to find at a later time that the
custom is disadvantageous, it is free to declare that it is
unwilling to abide by such a custom; and once it has clearly
made known its intention there is no room for complaint on the
part of others if it does not observe the custom. 86
Based on this quotation, they suggest that "according to
Vattel ... these nations nevertheless had an ability to opt out of
the [customary] rule if they later found it disadvantageous, as long
83 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 242-45, 251-52. Of the five paragraphs
devoted to the "Process of CIL Formation," treaties are only referenced as evidence of
the "influence of multilateral treaties" when discussing how quickly CIL can form. Id. at
242-43. The brief reference to treaties in the section discussing the formation of CIL is
contraposed with two-thirds of the paragraphs in "Adaptability to Change," devoted to
withdrawal rights from treaties and how these rights may affect CIL. Id at 251-52.
84 Mandatory, supra note 12, at 433. But see Dodge, supra note 7, at 173
(contending that while default rules may have existed, they were "completely
overshadowed by the mandatory rules of international law both in scope and
importance").
85 See Mandatory, supra note 12, at 427-28 ("Vattel's endorsement of the Default
View was influential in both international law commentary in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries as well as in early decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.").
86 Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 217 (citing VATrEL, supra note 1, at bk. IV, § 106)
(emphasis added); see also Mandatory, supra note 12, at 427.
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as they gave advance notice of their intention."" When viewed in
context, however, it is clear that Bradley and Gulati are mistaken
in continuing to claim that Vattel endorses their proposal for
unrestricted unilateral withdrawal.
This quotation, taken from Book IV, is not an isolated
commentary on the sovereign's right to withdraw from
international law. It is a response to a purported query from the
(European) Family of Nations regarding a sovereign's right to
deny diplomatic privileges or immunity to a particular dignitary in
the face of fraud or abuse.90 In all likelihood, Vattel's response
was written in light of lessons gleaned from England's experience
earlier that century when it denied sovereign immunity to an
ambassador of Peter the Great.91  Ultimately in response to
pressure from the Family of Nations, the British Parliament
dismissed all charges against the ambassador and then passed a
statute that "provided for severe penalties for future violations of
diplomatic immunities."92
Evidence of these lessons is apparent in the passage following
the referenced quotation. Vattel's explanation incorporated the
mandates of natural law: the sovereign must meet its own internal
needs and contribute to the general welfare of other states
"lawfully, and consistently with justice and honour [sic]."9 3
Rather than offering the right to withdraw from established custom
carte blanche simply by giving notice, Vattel instead defined the
parameters of withdrawal and reiterated the mutual dependence of
87 Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 217 (referencing Vattel's quote on the privileges
and immunities generally afforded to ambassadors).
88 See infra note 104 and accompanying text (noting this same quote attracted the
attention of Henry W. Halleck in his treatise as a statement with the potential to be easily
misunderstood).
89 VATTEL, supra note 1, at bk. IV, § 106.
90 See id. Vattel offers a specific example in the empress of St. Petersburg who
was forced to abolish the custom of exempting foreign ministers from duties on
importation due to the "frequency of its abuse." Id. at bk. IV, § 105.
91 See FINcH, supra note 30, at 49. Britain "arrested [the Ambassador] in an action
for debt and compelled [him] to give bail." Id. The response of the Czar, as well as
dignitaries of many other nations, was that of indignation. Id.
92 Id. The provisions of this statute were adopted "in substantially the same terms
by the United States Congress in 1790," and in 1764, Lord Mansfield described the
statute as "merely declaratory of the law of nations." Id.
93 VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 14 (emphasis in original).
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other sovereigns on established custom. 9
The limitations of such a narrow perspective of CIL creation
are more evident when the effect of the unilateral "opt out" is
applied to jus cogens norms." In Withdrawing, Bradley and
Gulati initially identified jus cogens norms as a synonym to CIL
rules. 96 in an apparent attempt to clarify this use, in Mandatory
they identified jus cogens norms as "[a] limited subset of CIL" for
which "there are strong arguments for treating .. . as
mandatory." 97 This understanding of jus cogens norms and the
manner in which these norms become a part of CIL merits
clarification. Jus cogens norms, such as the freedom from torture
by other sovereigns, do not become CIL by custom because they
are imperfect rights. They only become perfect, and thus
enforceable, rights, by mutual agreement. A fortiori, opting out of
jus cogens norms has consequences weightier than breach of
contract claims, and unilaterally opting out, even with notice, may
be antithetical to other desirable qualities of a global society."
94 See id. at bk. IV, § 106. Vattel reiterated the necessity of a state making its
declaration to break from an established custom to do so prior to any actual event in
which another state may have depended on it. Id. He argued that, in the case before
him, a state could not withhold any of the ambassadorial privileges normally extended by
established custom if such privileges were "essential to the nature of the embassy, and
necessary to ensure its legitimate success . . . [because to do so] is an expression of
contempt, and an actual injury." Id.; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 174-75
(challenging Bradley and Gulati's interpretation of the same quote and finding Vattel
expressly limited a state from withdrawing from any rules "essential to an embassy and
necessary to its proper success.") (citation omitted).
95 See Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the Utility of
Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 221, 222 (2010) (viewing as
a "fundamental flaw in their proposal" the failure to explain how it would be decided
which rules are subject to the Mandatory View and which the Default View); see also
Ochoa, supra note 11, at 167 (arguing that the lack of clarity in their proposal regarding
which CIL rules would be subject to opt out introduces "confusion and a lack of
predictability").
96 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 213-14. "There is significant debate about the
materials that are relevant in discerning the existence of a CIL (or jus cogens) rule." Id
at 213. "Whatever the proper role of consent in international law, CIL (as it is currently
conceived) is less consensual than treaty-based law . . . . Jus cogens norms are even less
consensual." Id. at 214.
97 Mandatory, supra note 12, at 443, 451.
98 See Luban, supra note 4, at 164-66 (noting the potential weakening of the law of
war and the "unraveling of the fragile International Humanitarian Law"); see also
Ochoa, supra note 11, at 167; Roberts, supra note 11, at 174 (noting the "hazardous"
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In Mandatory, Bradley and Gulati acknowledged the "tentative
nature of the [their] historical analysis" and the necessity of a
more comprehensive "examination of the intellectual origins of the
Mandatory View."99 This recognition is encouraging, as their
historical analysis did not accurately convey Vattel's theory of
CIL formation nor the fundamental principles-equal dignity of
sovereigns, interdependency of nations, and maintaining trusting,
respectful relations-on which it was based. Arguably, these
considerations are equally important in evaluating "the normative
underpinnings of the Mandatory View and . .. the extent to which
that View is consistent with contemporary normative
commitments." 00
III. History's Effect on the Legacy of Vattel
For centuries, international philosophers have debated the
origin, methods of formation, and obligatory force of international
law.o' The absence of a formal legislative process led some to
deny the existence of international law altogether;102 nevertheless,
most treatise writers adopted either a naturalistl'03 or positivist
implications of the withdrawal proposal outside of academia). Bradley and Gulati agree
that there may be some limits on opting out, but who sets the limits and how that will be
determined is another question. See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 45-62.
99 Mandatory, supra note 12, at 438.
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., WHEATON, supra note 34, at 6-8.
102 See JANIS, supra note 32, at 5. "The trouble with such a simplistic assertion is
that it contradicts centuries of practice during which governments, courts, and others
have, for one reason or another, found and applied rules of international law." Id. A
notorious critic of international jurisprudence, John Austin, asserted in 1832 that, without
an international sovereign to enforce it, it was "improper" to refer to it as law as it was
really "a form of mere 'morality."' Id. at 2-3.
103 See discussion supra Part II.A. and Part II.C.; see also FINCH, supra note 30, at
19-21. Pufendorf, a naturalist, outright "rejected [custom] ... as unsuited to serve as the
source of the universal law of nations because of its inconsistencies and differences
among many people . . . ." FINCH, supra note 30, at 19. In 1883, Scotchman James
Lorimer, "defined international law as 'the law of nature realized in the relations of
separate nations' . . . [he believed it necessary] to place international law on deeper and
more stable foundations than comity or convention . . . ." Id. at 20-21. His views were
largely adopted by Sir Henry Sumner Maine who lectured on natural law at Cambridge
University in 1887. Id. Maine disagreed with Pufendorf's contention that the natural
state of man was at peace, believing instead that "mankind started from a condition of
innocent peace which was . . . transformed by man's depravity into virtually universal
and unceasing war." Id. at 21.
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view'04 of the law or, like Vattel, viewed international law as a
compilation of both.'o Even those who adopted both natural law
and positive law did so with varying emphasis and
interpretation.10 6
Theorists adopting a "positivist" view placed different weights
on the role of the three types of positive international law
(conventional, customary, and voluntary) identified by Vattel.0 o
Conventional law, requiring actors take deliberate, express actions
to form CIL, was the most common and accepted form of
international law.'0o Usually manifested in the form of treaties,
conventional law was embraced by jurists and treatise writers as a
means of establishing, defining, revising, or avoiding international
law.109
104 See discussion supra Part IIA, D; see also FINCH, supra note 30, at 20. In 1849,
Englishman Richard Wildman "denied categorically that the law of nature forms any part
of international law." FINCH, supra note 30, at 20. He believed the rules imposed under
natural law "are fit to inform the conscience of statesmen, but not to define international
rights." Id. (quoting I RICHARD WILDMAN, INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(London, William Benning & Co. 1849)).
105 See 1 H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES REGULATING THE
INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR (H. H. Bancroft & Co. 1861) (referencing
the works of Grotius, Phillemore, and Vattel); see, e.g., WHEATON, supra note 34, at 9-
18. Wheaton cites the works of Bynkershoek, Grotius, James Madison, Puffendorf,
Christian Wolff and Wilhem Heffter and notes both Vattel and Wolff saw natural law as
something "immutable . . . [that is both] necessary and indispensable, [and] nations can
neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own
conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it." Id. at 12.
Whereas, another theorist, Leibniz, claimed that "[t]he basis of international law is
natural law, which has been modified according to times and local circumstances." Id at
16; FINCH, supra note 30, at 23. There is common agreement amongst modem scholars
that the natural law is a product of Roman civil law,jusfeciale orjus gentium, and the
canons of the Catholic Church; nevertheless, the sacrosanct nature of natural law is often
disputed. Id
106 See HALLECK, supra note 105, at 42-62; see also FINCH, supra note 30, at 23-25
(noting that Grotius did not adopt natural law to the exclusion of positive law, and Wolff,
a follower of Grotius, identified the same four types of international law and manners of
creation identified by Vattel); WHEATON, supra note 34, at 3-20.
107 See WHEATON, supra note 34, at 7-21.
108 See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text; see also Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S.
993 [hereinafter I.C.J. Statute] (ranking international agreements, such as treaties, first in
the accepted listing of the sources of international law).
109 See WHEATON, supra note 34, at 20-21. Wheaton includes treaties as one of his
six sources of international law. He also cites: (1) text-writers of authority, (2)
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Theorists agreed that international customary law was created
by the implied consent of "civilized" nations; 'o rationalizing the
close geographic proximity of the affected nations provided actual
or constructive notice of the custom."' This implicit consent
accorded customary law the same weight in the international
community as common law held in municipalities." 2 Henry
Wheaton, a noted American international law theorist, contended
that written decisions "drawn from the usages and practices of the
people, and from reason and policy ... [are] the highest evidence
of what the law is."" 3
A contemporary of Wheaton, Henry Halleck emphasized the
importance of the reliability of customary law." He also
recognized the scholarly confusion created by Vattel's use of the
term "voluntary.""' Throughout his 1861 treatise, Halleck
attempted to clarify Vattel's meaning and preempt scholarly
mischaracterization of voluntary law as one to which a country
may voluntarily submit instead of one where its consent was
presumed.16 Halleck noted evidence of such mischaracterization
ordinances of particular States (regarding admiralty rules), (3) adjudications of
international tribunals, (4) written opinions of official jurists (given in confidence to their
own governments) and (5) history (of wars, negotiations, and public
transactions/treaties). Id. at 20-23. But see FINCH supra note 30, at 19 ("[B]ut if any
custom is based upon the natural law, it has far more dignity than if its origin is based
upon the simple agreement of nations" (citing PUFENDORF, supra note 30)).
110 See generally HALLECK, supra note 105 (articulating this conception of
customary law); VATTEL, supra note 1; WHEATON, supra note 34.
111 See WHEATON, supra note 34, at 12. The majority of theorists, such as Vattel,
originally wrote about the international law between the nations of Europe. The United
States, as a colony and eventually as a sovereign nation, adopted these same customs,
thus becoming one of the "civilized" nations. See FINCH, supra note 30, at 43
(referencing the dicta from the ICJ in the Asylum case in 1950 acknowledging that
"some customary international law may be determined to be merely regional. . .
112 See WHEATON, supra note 34, at 13.
113 Id. at 23; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 180-82.
114 See HALLECK, supra note 105.
115 See id. at 49. Halleck notes that Vattel's terminology "has been objected to by
some as improper, and calculated to confuse rather than to elucidate the subject." FINCH,
supra note 30, at 37. Henry W. Halleck was trained as an army commander at West
Point. Id This training and his "distinguished career in the United States Army" prior to
becoming chief of staff to President Lincoln, offered a valuable perspective to his 1861
treatise on International Law. Id.
116 See HALLECK, supra note 105, at 50. In one such attempt, Halleck identified one
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between the first edition of Wheaton's treatise published in 1836
and later editions.' Wheaton's choice to quote seventeenth
century positivist Bynkershoek exemplified his evolving positivist
view of international law: "The law of nations is only a
presumption founded upon usage, and every such presumption
ceases the moment the will of the party is declared to the
contrary."
Many academics and courts adopted this change in perception
throughout the nineteenth century as nations struggled with which,
if any, sources of international law were "binding."ll 9  The
Christian and humanitarian principles of natural law-the
foundation of international law for treatise writers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-dissipated during the
nineteenth century as the expansion of colonialism and its inherent
notions of moral supremacy took hold.
A. Customary Law and Colonialism
Bradley and Gulati contend that a shift from the Default View
of the same Vattel quotations cited by Bradley and Gulati. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text. Paradoxically, whereas Bradley and Gulati interpret Vattel's writing
as support for a unilateral withdrawal, Halleck interpreted it to reiterate the necessary
limits that must be imposed on nations who want to unilaterally withdraw from
international custom. Compare HALLECK, supra note 105, at 49 ("The foregoing remark
of Vattel, that the customary law of nations may be varied or abandoned at pleasure,
such variation or abandonment being previously notified, must be limited to the peculiar
customs of particular states in their intercourse with other nations, and cannot be applied
to general law, or what he calls the voluntary law of nations, which is founded on general
usage or implied consent . . . ."), with Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 217 ("Thus,
according to Vattel, a customary rule of international law was biding on nations that had
tacitly accepted it, but these nations nevertheless had an ability to opt out of the rule if
they later found it to be disadvantageous, so long as they gave advance notice of their
intention."); see also William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Congress, and
the Courts: Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule 4 (Sept. 15, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474037 [hereinafter Later-in-Time Rule]
117 HALLECK, supra note 105, at 49. Wheaton adopted Vattel's trilogy of positive
international law in his first edition, he later characterized "voluntary law" as equivalent
to what Vattel deemed "positive law." See WHEATON, supra note 34, at 13; see also
Dodge, supra note 7, at 181 (noting Wheaton's increasing criticism of Vattel in
subsequent editions).
118 WHEATON, supra note 34, at 10. Wheaton designates "voluntary law" as the
genus of all positive international law and customary law and conventional law, both of
which require an affirming action on the part of the sovereign, as the species. Id at 13.
119 See Later-in-Time Rule, supra note 116, at 14.
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to the Mandatory View occurred in the implementation of CIL
between the publishing of Vattel's treatise and the turn of the
twentieth century. 120  In Withdrawing, Bradley and Gulati
attempted to identify the underlying forces causing this perceived
shift by briefly exploring two theories: the philosophical shift from
natural law to positivism and the effect of colonialism on CIL. 12 1
By examining these theories in their historical context, it becomes
apparent that elements of both theories form the pilings of the
bridge spanning from eighteenth century to modern
understandings of CIL.
Bradley and Gulati effectively dismissed the first theory-the
philosophical shift from natural law to positivism-for two
reasons: (1) the presence of positivist sentiments in court opinions
prior to the end of the nineteenth century; (2) and the inherent
nature of positivism that requires every law be posited by a society
with a governing authority to enforce the law. 122 As previously
noted, however, philosophers were already debating the merits of
positivism and naturalism when considering the origin of
international law in the eighteenth century. 123  Furthermore,
evidence of previous recognition of positivism should not discount
the deliberate choice by treatise writers of the nineteenth century
to embrace Bynkershoek and the positivist aspects of Vattel's
treatise rather than the naturalist writings of Grotius and
Pufendorf. 124
As academics and jurists wrestled with applying the Law of
Nations, especially when it conflicted with their own social,
political, or cultural values, a dualist approach to international law
120 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 226-28 ("It is difficult to know precisely when
the shift to the Mandatory View occurred. . . . Absent other evidence, the date of the
publication of Oppenheim's treatise-I 905-might seem like a reasonable date for
making the shift in the literature towards the Mandatory View."). But see Dodge, supra
note 7, at 184 (discounting the evidence advanced by Bradley and Gulati documenting a
shift to the Mandatory View).
121 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 229-32 (stating they find one theory
"implausible" and the other "plausible but normatively unattractive.").
122 See id. at 229-30; see also Later-in-Time Rule, supra note 116, at 19 ("The shift
from natural law to positivism during the nineteenth century might well have
undermined the idea that there could be any binding rules of customary international law
at all.").
123 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
124 See WHEATON, supra note 34, at 8-10.
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emerged.'25 Acceptance of this dualist perspective allowed the
Law of Nations to be viewed as a "floor, rather than a ceiling,"l 26
encompassing only those rules to which all nations agree to be
bound.127  Combining natural and positive law in various fashions
provided substantial arguments to justify the imposition of CIL on
the colonies of the imperialists.128
In Mandatory, Bradley and Gulati placed greater weight on the
role of colonialism as a factor causing a perceived shift from the
Default View to the Mandatory View and related the gradual shift
in perception to the explosion of colonialism at the end of the
century.129  If civilized nations altered their conceptualization of
CIL during the height of colonial expansion, then the political
realities and philosophical beliefs of those nations are relevant.
Arguably, they are not germane to understanding the past, but they
are material to evaluating a proposal allowing unilateral
withdrawal in the twenty-first century.13 0
125 See FINCH, supra note 30, at 26-27. In conflicts between "concepts based upon
the law of nature and principles flowing from the theory of the consent of nations . . .
natural law theories usually are subordinated to the more pressing demands of material
considerations." Id. at 26. To exemplify this point the author references Chief Justice
Marshall's words in The Antelope, "proclaiming the equality of states and the legal
corollary that no nation can make law except for itself' as justifying the return rather
than freeing of captured slaves to Spain. Id. at 27; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
126 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
127 See JANIS, supra note 32, at 85. "Dualism" pervades modern legal theory
viewing municipal and international legal systems "as separate and discrete entities, each
with its own power to settle the effect any rule of law might have within it." Id.
Contrary to dualism is the "monist" approach, which "views the international legal order
and all national legal orders as component parts of a single 'universal legal order' in
which international law has a certain supremacy." Id. at 85-86 (referencing H. KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 553-588 (2d ed. Tucker 1966)); see also Later-in-
Time Rule, supra note 116, at 19.
128 See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2-3 (1999).
129 Compare Mandatory, supra note 12, at 436 (declining to advance the argument
that "the desire of the Western nations to further their imperial agendas provides the only
explanation" but recognizing "there are strong reasons to believe that . . . it suited the
[interests of] colonial purposes . . . to have the uncivilized world included."), with
Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 231 (denying that colonialism provided any "normative
justification for adhering to the Mandatory View . . . in a postcolonial world made up of
nearly two hundred heterogeneous nations").
130 See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-05 (2004). Prior to the nineteenth century, treatise writers
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B. The Law of Civilized Nations
Given that the origins of the Law of Nations were Roman law
and the canons of the Catholic Church, it is not surprising that
classicists distinguished between civilized and uncivilized nations
when determining to whom the Law of Nations applied.' The
civilized nations referenced by Vattel and his predecessors were
those comprising the European community.132 Other, uncivilized
nations, were outside the confines of this community and were
recognized as having their own sets of governing laws.'3 3 Another
essential element of international law recognized in every treatise
is the absence of an international sovereign to enforce the laws
governing the interactions between states.'34 Thus, CIL was
"enforced not by the use of the axe or the scimitar, the knout or the
bayonet, but by the public opinion of the community."' If the
only sanctions inflicted by the civilized European community of
the eighteenth century on violators were social ostracism or war,
then logically mutual respect for one's neighbors must have been
intrinsic to the Law of Nations prior to the 1870s.13 6
used the term "sovereign" to refer exclusively to European nations. When the European
nations began to colonize other nations, it became necessary to differentiate between
these other nations and the colonizing "sovereign" nations. In order to do so, the
colonizing nations used terms such as "uncivilized," "barbaric," and "savages;" however,
the sovereignty of these colonized or conquered nations was of importance when there
was a need "to transfer title, to grant rights - whether trading, to territory, or to
sovereignty itself." Id. at 105.
131 See FINCH, supra note 30, at 23 ("The Roman jus gentium was called the law of
nations, not in the sense in which the term international law is now used to denote the
principles governing the relations between nations, but as being based upon the
principles of good faith and equity which underlay and were recognized in the particular
law of each community."); see also WHEATON, supra note 34, at 9-19.
132 See JANIS, supra note 32, at 55.
133 See also infra note 137 and accompanying text (referencing Wheaton's quote of
Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brdde et de Montesquieu).
134 WHEATON, supra note 34, at 3 ("[N]o legislative or judicial authority ... [exists
to] regulate the reciprocal relations of States."); see, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 1;
HALLECK, supra note 105.
135 FINCH, supra note 30, at 45 (referencing the writings of Dr. Thomas A. Walker,
author of the Science ofInternational Law published in 1893); see also WHEATON, supra
note 34, at 8. Any civilized nation that chooses to violate the Law of Nations also
"chooses to incur the risk of retaliation or hostility, these being the only sanctions by
which the duties of international law can be enforced." WHEATON, supra note 34, at 8.
136 See generally FINCH, supra note 30, at 46 ("In pointing out the need of popular
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A contemporary of Vattel, French philosopher Charles-Louis
de Secondat, baron de la Br6de et de Montesquieu
("Montesquieu"), clearly stipulated that the Law of Nations was
particular to a subset of civilized nations, while other uncivilized
nations had their own binding laws.' Although the laws of the
uncivilized nations were recognized, the superiority of the Law of
Nations was axiomatic among the civilized nations at the end of
the nineteenth century. 3 ' This notion of moral and intellectual
supremacy, similar to that which was vehemently upheld in the
seventeenth century by Grotius on the supremacy of natural law,
fueled the expansionist political desires of the sovereigns.13 9
C. Bringing The Law of Civilized Nations to the Uncivilized
During the height of colonial expansion, the natural law or
voluntary law protections that would have been mandated to
civilized nations under Vattel's principles were not accorded to the
uncivilized nations that were the objects of conquest in Africa and
the Far East.'4 0 There is no evidence of any "critic[ism] or even
suspicio[n] of official colonialism" in the international law
treatises of the 1800s; rather, these treatises upheld the belief that
civilized nations had the "right to extend their settlement and
understanding of international law, . . . [The Honorable Elihu Root, the first president of
the American Society of International Law] remarked: 'In every civil community . . . the
true basis of the peace and order in which we live is not fear of the policeman; it is the
self-restraint of the thousands of people who make up the community and their
willingness to obey the law and regard the rights of others . . . it is the voluntary
observance of the rules and obligations of business life which are universally recognized
as essential to business success.")
137 See WHEATON, supra note 34, at 16 ("[E]very [group of sovereign] nation[s] has
a law of nations - even the Iroquois, who eat their prisoners, have one.").
138 See FINCH, supra note 30, at 24-25. A disciple of Grotius, Christian Wolff
(1679-1754), "contended that the totality of states forms a world state, the so-called
civitas gentium maxima, above the component member states." Id. Wolff viewed this
world state as having the ability to "tacitly impose" voluntary laws upon the member
states. Id. at 25; see also ANGHIE, supra note 130, at 1.
139 Brophy, supra note 26 ("[Bly the late nineteenth century, we had a sense that we
had figured out the best rules and wanted to impose them everywhere" and "part of the
'civilizing' mission was to bring western values like the market and Christianity to far
off lands.").
140 See ANGHIE, supra note 130, at 85; see also discussion supra Part Ht.D
(according respect to all human beings under natural law and protection of the safety and
welfare of citizens under voluntary law).
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authority by discovery and effective occupation in new
countries."' 4 ' Furthermore, little attention was drawn to or
criticism rendered against the actions taken by the European
powers against the native inhabitants of the colonies-actions that
were clearly contrary to the laws between sovereigns according to
the Law of Nations.14 2
When colonizing uncivilized nations, the imperialists
attempted to rectify what they viewed as anarchy by replacing
indigenous political governments with European models and
imposing the established Law of Nations on the colonies. 143  A
map of Africa during the height of European colonization
demonstrates the arbitrariness of the geographic locations of the
colonies and the myriad of European imperialists.144 As Bradley
and Gulati contend, this transplantation of the European Law of
Nations into the uncivilized nations of the world offers a practical
explanation for the perceived shift to the Mandatory View.145
Extending the civilized Law of Nations to their colonies was not
only pragmatic, but also necessary, as European citizens, armies,
and diplomats were regularly traveling through the colonies of
other European sovereigns and entering into commercial
transactions with uncivilized colonists.
The impact of the imperialists' extension of the Law of
Nations to their colonies continued even after decolonization. 146
International law that once applied exclusively to the small, tight-
knit European community was now ostensibly afforded the same
141 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, 116 (2002); see also Mandatory, supra note 12, at
435.
142 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 141, at 166; see also Mandatory, supra note 12, at
436.
143 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 141, at 166.
144 Imperialism in Africa on the Eve of WWI, W.W. NORTON & CO.,
http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/ralph/resource/impafr.htm (last visited Jan.
13, 2012).
145 See Mandatory, supra note 12, at 435-36.
146 See FINCH, supra note 30, at 25 (quoting Chancellor James Kent, an early
commentator on American law regarding the United States assimilation into the
European Family of Nations, who wrote, "when the United States ceased to be a part of
the British Empire, and assumed the character of an independent nation, they became
subject to that system of rules which reason, morality, and custom had established
among the civilized nations of Europe, as their public law.").
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deference throughout the new civilized world.14 7  For various
reasons many countries that were not colonized eventually chose
to ratify treaties and adopt CIL.14 8 Conversely, some independent
uncivilized sovereigns were forced by Western powers to adopt
particular aspects, such as "diplomatic and commercial
intercourse," of CIL thought to be universally binding.149
IV. Supreme Court Decisions
While the majority of colonial expansion in Africa and the Far
East was the product of actions taken by Europeans, the United
States wrestled with many of the same expansion issues within its
own borders against the "savage" natives."so Evolving in its own
self-perception from colony to empire, Supreme Court dicta began
to espouse a dualistic view of the responsibility of the United
States to enforce international law.'' In Withdrawing, Bradley
and Gulati referenced these dicta as evidence of the shift from the
Default to the Mandatory View.'5 2 Although supportive of their
premise, the excerpted dicta often deviated from the overriding
spirit of the Court's decision and ultimate holdings.'
Recognizing the undisputed influence of Vattel's treatise on
early Supreme Court decisions,'5 4 this article reexamines Bradley
147 See ANGHIE, supra note 130, at 195 ("Decolonization effectively universalized
the European State as the only form of government that would provide equal status in the
organized international community supported the powerful claim that international law
had finally become, for the first time, truly universal.").
148 Timothy Webster, Insular Minorities: International Law's Challenge to Japan's
Ethnic Homogeneity, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 557, 558-59 (2011) (stating
Japan's motivation for ratifying treaties and adopting CIL).
149 FINCH, supra note 30, at 56 (noting in the mid-nineteenth century, Western
powers forced China and Japan to engage in "diplomatic and commercial intercourse.");
see also Mandatory, supra note 12, at 437.
150 See generally discussion infra Part IV.C.
151 See Dodge, supra note 7, at 176-78.
152 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 219-26 ("Early U.S. Supreme Court decisions
. . . envisioned that CIL rules were binding only on nations that continued to accept
them"). Bradley and Gulati's article cites dicta in various cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court throughout the latter half of the eighteenth century and throughout the
nineteenth century such as Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), The Antelope, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825), The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812),
and ending with The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Id
153 See discussion infra Parts IV.A, B, D; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 179.
154 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 219 n.68; see also FINCH, supra note 30, at 25.
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and Gulati's analysis of the Court's application of Vattelian
principles in three decisions."' By focusing on the holdings,
rather than mere dicta, the Court's conceptualization of the Law of
Nations in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries becomes
evident, as does its rejection of unilateral withdrawal from CIL.
A. The Schooner Exchange"'
In 1812, the Supreme Court decided The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon & Others."' The Court dismissed the libel suit,
brought by individuals against another sovereign nation, France,
and upheld sovereign immunity as understood and applied through
the Law of Nations.' As was typical of the beginning of the
eighteenth century, the dicta in this decision vacillated between
naturalist and positivist sentiments.15 9 Within the same sentence,
Chief Justice Marshall espoused both the "equal rights and equal
independence" of each sovereign throughout the world and the
"absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective
territories which sovereignty confers."'6 0 Marshall enumerated
rights conferred on sovereigns, arguably based in Vattel's
voluntary law, and explained that a breach of these rights would
violate "privileges which are essential to the dignity of his
sovereign."l6 1
Whereas Bradley and Gulati emphasized the positivist aspect
of the Court's dicta,'6 2 Marshall's voluntary reasoning undergirded
the Court's analysis.163 For example, Marshall contended that
155 See discussion infra Parts IV.A - D. For example Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), exemplifies the disparate application of the Law of Nations by
the United States to disputes between civilized sovereigns and disputes between a
civilized nation and an uncivilized nation.
156 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
157 Id.
158 Id. at 147.
159 See Later-in-Time Rule, supra note 116, at 23.
160 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
161 Id. at 139. But see Dodge, supra note 7, at 177-79 (discussing other decisions in
which the Court questioned voluntary withdrawal from the Law of Nations).
162 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 220-23.
163 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137-38 (1812) ("Why has the
whole civilized world concurred in this construction?"); see also Later-in-Time Rule,
supra note 116, at 13. There are two tenets of international law that appear at odds in
this case-the absolute jurisdiction of a sovereign within his own borders and sovereign
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allowing nations to opt out with notice of granting sovereign
immunity would deny a sovereign security on which his country
depends and "subject him to jurisdiction incompatible with his
dignity, and the dignity of his nation. . . ."' Although Marshall
acknowledged positivist ideals in dicta, the Court upheld the Law
of Nations without requiring a separate act of the legislative or
executive branches. 16 5
B. The Antelopel 6 6
Another Supreme Court case cited by Bradley and Gulati, The
Antelope, confronted the same issues of naturalism and
positivism. 16 ' Decided in 1825, Chief Justice Marshall again
deferred to the Law of Nations regarding the slaves found aboard
the captured vessel, contrary to the vehement arguments of Francis
Scott Key and Attorney General William Wirt.168  Marshall
logically bifurcated the conflicting issues of morality and legality
when deciding the fate of the human cargo.' 6 1
immunity. See The Schooner Exchange, II U.S. (7 Cranch) at 138 (absolute jurisdiction
of a sovereign within his own borders). The appellees argue under the first tenet while
the government argues under sovereign immunity. Id. at 117-19. Marshall crafts a
response that recognizes both, but crafts it with a positivist stance that changes the
voluntary law of sovereign immunity into customary law because it was endorsed by the
United States. See id at 118-47.
164 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 137.
165 Id. at 147.
166 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
167 Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 229, n.l10.
168 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 66-114. At first glance, the sheer volume
of pages dedicated to including the arguments made by opposing counsels demonstrates
the significance placed on the decision by the abolitionists. Marshall's word choice in
the first paragraph of the opinion provides insight into the moral dilemma faced by the
Court. He points out that the United States:
[A]ppear[s] in the character of guardians, or next friends, of these Africans, who
are brought, without any act of their own, into the bosom of our country ....
[Whereas] [t]he Consuls of Spain and Portugal . . . demand these Africans as
slaves, who have, in the regular course of legitimate commerce, been acquired
as property by the subjects of their respective sovereigns, and claim their
restitution under the laws of the United States.
Id. at 114.
169 Id. at 121. "Whatever might be the answer of a moralist to this question, a jurist
must search for its legal solution in those principles of action. . . ." Id; see also ANGHIE,
supra note 130, at 44 (noting the necessity of separating law from morality to positivist
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In his moral perspective, Marshall extolled the naturalist
perception of the equal dignity and sovereignty of all nations and
ascribed to the undeniable claim that slavery violated the law of
nature. 170  Nonetheless, as previously noted, these internal
obligations did not, by their nature, give the United States the right
to compel compliance. 17 1 The country could only do so through a
mutual agreement binding each nation.17 2 As no statutes existed
for guidance, Marshall assigned the jurist the (positivist) task of
"search[ing] for [the] legal solution, in those principles of action
which are sanctioned by the usages, the national acts, and the
general assent, of that portion of the world of which he considers
himself as a part . . .. It was from these observations that he
concluded that although slavery was morally contrary to the law of
nature, it did not legally violate the Law of Nations. 174
Bradley and Gulati emphasize Marshall's statement: "No
principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than
the perfect equality of nations. . . . It results from this equality,
that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another."' When
viewed in isolation, this notion could be interpreted as supportive
of a country's right to unilaterally withdraw from CIL.
Nonetheless, the reasoning advanced by the Court emphasized a
sovereign's reliance on CIL and the equality of sovereign nations.
In search of the legal standard, Marshall looked to the actions of
both civilized and uncivilized nations to determine the appropriate
standard.176 Marshall found that civilized countries were not in a
jurists of the nineteenth centuries).
170 See id at 120-22. "That [the slave trade] is contrary to the law of nature will
scarcely be denied." Id. at 120.
171 See VATrEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 17 (stating perfect rights give one state
the right to compel another to fulfill an obligation).
172 See id. (stating that imperfect rights only give one the right to request
compliance).
173 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 121 (1825); see also Later-in-Time Rule,
supra note 116, at 16.
174 See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 120-21 ("Slavery, then, has its origin in
force; but as the world has agreed that it is a legitimate result of force, the state of things
which is thus produced by general consent, cannot be pronounced unlawful.").
175 Id. at 122.
176 See id at 120-121. For a modem explanation of how jurists determine the
general principals of law, see JANIS, supra note 32, at 56. An exercise in comparative
law is the search for evidence of precedent in other foreign jurisdictions that has
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position to condemn slavery because they had engaged in the
practice in the past."' Even though many civilized countries had
agreed, by treaty, to abstain from the slave trade, the Law of
Nations prohibited them from compelling other sovereigns to
abstain likewise.' As the Law of Nations only provided a floor,
the international slave trade was not prohibited by it.' 79
The reality of the holding in The Antelope, despite the
positivist dicta, was that although the United States opposed the
international slave trade, imposing domestic law on other
sovereign nations would violate the Law of Nations.'" In this
instance, Francis Scott Key and the Attorney General were arguing
for precisely the opt out rule proposed by Bradley and Gulati."'
Hoping the treaties would give notice that the United States no
longer supported the international slave trade, they wanted the
Court to opt out and free the slaves from the ship; however, the
Law of Nations dictated that no nation could prescribe a rule for
other nations.'82 A fortiori, no country has the right to unilaterally
opt out and begin to enforce its own domestic law on another
sovereign-even with notice. Such an action would arguably have
been seen as uncivilized because "no civilized nation ... [would]
arrogantly. . . venture to disregard the uniform sense of the
established writers of international law." 8 3
Since the argument to allow for unilateral withdrawal from
CIL was originally rejected when made by abolitionists to save
human beings from the cruelties of slavery, it becomes difficult to
persuasive value to international jurists. Id. This process is similar to the process
engaged in to discover non-binding precedent in municipal law from other jurisdictions.
Id.
177 See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 121 ("Can those who have themselves
renounced this law, be permitted to participate in its effects by purchasing the beings
who are its victims?").
178 See id.
179 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) ("[T]his traffic remains
lawful to those whose governments have not forbidden it.").
Igo See id.
181 See id. at 122-23.
182 See id. at 122. Had the Court applied U.S. municipal law and released the slaves,
then it would effectively have sanctioned the imposition of its own law on Spain, which
lawfully continued to engage in the slave trade.
183 FINCH, supra note 30, at 32 (quoting Chancellor Kent's Commentaries).
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imagine other scenarios in which it might be deemed appropriate.
Similar to the contemporary interpretation of CIL, countries that
disagreed with the Law of Nations had the right to create contrary
laws, but these laws were only applicable within its own borders
and only to affect its own citizens. 8 4  Countries could induce
others, by treaty, to mutually to relinquish a right established by
CIL and then hold each other accountable to the terms of the
treaty.'"' This same process, originally outlined by Vattel in order
to create a perfect right from an imperfect one-continues to be
applicable to modem CIL.
C. Johnson v. M'Intosh'86
Bradley and Gulati do not cite Johnson v. MIntosh;
nevertheless, the opinion, issued just two years prior to The
Antelope, illustrates the effect of colonialism on CIL
implementation and offers another perspective on the historical
evolution of the CIL.'" It merits noting that the parties in The
Antelope were equal sovereigns: the United States, France, Spain,
and Portugal (the African slaves were mere property to be
allocated appropriately).' This becomes a material fact when
applying the Court's reasoning in Johnson v. M'Intosh to two
unequal sovereign nations.
Johnson v. M'Intosh addressed whatever the Native Americans
had the right to grant title to land and if such title would be
recognized in U.S. courts.'89 Originally, colonial law allowed
colonists to purchase land directly from the Native Americans as
equal sovereigns.'90 Although as the eighteenth century
progressed, the colonists evolving perception of the Native
184 See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825).
185 Id
186 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
187 Id.
188 See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 67.
189 See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 543. The plaintiffs in the case had title to
tracts of land legally purchased from the Chiefs of the Illinois and Piankeshaw nations
fifty years earlier. Id. at 550-53. The defendant was a strawman, supported by a group
of land speculators, who purchased a single tract of land from the federal government
that overlapped the land of the plaintiffs. See id at 560; see also STUART BANNER, How
THE INDIANS LoST THEIR LAND 52 (2009).
190 See BANNER, supra note 189, at 28.
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Americans as unequal sovereigns became increasingly evident;
and, was evidenced in the 1763 Proclamation. The Proclamation
of 1763 which "marked the first time the imperial government
treated Native American and English landowners in such a
systematically disparate fashion."l 91 Despite the Proclamation,
U.S. government officials still considered the land not yet
purchased by the federal government as belonging to the Native
Americans as late as the 1790s.1 92 However, by 1807, there was a
documented shift in legal thought; the Native Americans no longer
retained an ownership interest in the land but merely a possessory
right.1 93 By the time Johnson v. M'Intosh was decided in 1823, the
transformation from equal to unequal sovereigns was complete.
The Marshall Court purported "they were simply following the
rule laid down by their English colonial predecessors, and that the
Indians had never been accorded full ownership of their land."l 94
Similar to The Antelope, Marshall rationalized the decision
balancing both naturalist and positivist sentiments.'9 Although
the United States was one of the newest civilized nations, notions
of moral supremacy inherent in colonial expansion were evident in
Marshall's justification of the holding under the doctrines of
Discovery and Conquest.196 Applying the Discovery Doctrine,
191 Id. at 94. At the conclusion of the war between France and Britain, the British
drew an arbitrary line through the continent and temporarily banned settlement to the
west of the line without specific approval from the Crown and ordered anyone already
settled west of the line to move immediately. Id. at 92. To the "east of the newly
established boundary, the proclamation banned private purchasing . . . and established
that all land must be purchased only for the Crown . .. and prohibited secret purchases of
land from individual Indians." Id. at 93.
192 See id. at 169.
193 See id. (referencing Strother v. Cathey, 5 N.C. 162 (1807) (involving the
Cherokee tribe)).
194 See id. at 150 (emphasis included in original).
195 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572 (1823).
[Ilt will be necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to examine, not singly those
principles of abstract justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed on
the mind of his creature man, and which are admitted to regulate, in a great
degree, the rights of civilized nations, whose perfect independence is
acknowledged; but those principles also which our own government has
adopted in the particular case, and given us as the rule for our decision.
Id.
196 Id. at 569.
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Marshall contended the Native Americans were not the rightful
owners of their land.197  The Law of Nations afforded the
discovering nation not only a territorial right to the entire land,
both occupied and vacant, but also freedom to govern the natives
without censure from fellow sovereigns.' Alternatively,
Marshall applied the Conquest Doctrine, explaining that what once
began as a discovery had evolved into a conquest; any title so
obtained was justified.'
Under either rationale, the Native Americans were deprived of
the title to their land and were subjugated to retaining only a
possessory interest that the sovereign could revoke at will.2 0 0
Marshall justified the use of force against the natives to maintain
the title as necessary to encourage the assimilation of the natives
into the new civilized culture. 20 ' The Law of Nations obligated the
conquering nation to defend its citizens against any natives that
continued to assert their independence or threaten the settlers and
their families.20 2 Because only public opinion of fellow civilized
sovereigns could circumscribe the acts of the conqueror, there was
no recourse available to the conquered natives.2 03
While this opinion applied two elements of Vattel's treatise, it
evaluated the application solely from the perspective of the
civilized nation. The perspective of the uncivilized nation was
disregarded. Johnson v. M'Intosh confirmed the embarkation of
the United States on the same "civilizing mission. . . [that]
197 Id. at 573 (applying the longstanding customary agreement amongst European
nations that "discovery gave title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose
authority, it was made. . .
198 See id at 595.
199 See id. at 588 ("Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the
original justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted.").
200 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823).
201 See id.
202 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 22. Vattel's universal voluntary law
allows a sovereign to "resort to forcible means for the purpose of repressing any one
particular nation who openly violates the laws of the society which nature has
established between them, or who directly attacks the welfare and safety of that society."
Id.; see also Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 566.
203 See Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 590 (noting that the only limitation placed on
the conqueror, when instigated by the natives, was social reproach from fellow
"civilized" sovereigns).
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justified colonialism as a means of redeeming the backward,
aberrant, violent, oppressed, undeveloped people of the non-
European world by incorporating them into the universal
civilization of Europe."204 This approach to CIL application
conformed to the actions of other nineteenth century imperialists.
Theoretically, the North American continent offered the
natives and colonists the opportunity to form a Family of Nations
similar to Europe.20 5 Initially, treaties were signed and title to
property was exchanged between sovereigns who arguably, but
mistakenly, viewed themselves as equals.206 The Proclamation of
1763, drawing an arbitrary division through the natives' land and
restraining alienation, was the functional equivalent of one
sovereign unilaterally opting out, with notice, from the CIL that
previously dictated exchanges of property. While advantageous to
the opting out member, it was undoubtedly to the detriment of
those who had relied on established CIL.
D. The Paquete Habana207
As the United States began to emerge as a formidable force
internationally, Americans felt less need to defer and succumb to
international law.208 Consequently, a dualist perspective of
international law emerged which satisfied the nationalism and
moral relativism of the era.20 9 Justice Gray addressed these
popular sentiments as he balanced the contradicting dicta in a
previous decision and The Paquete Habana's holding affirming
CIL.210  Almost immediately, Gray defers to the "ancient usage
204 ANGHIE, supra note 130, at 3.
205 Similar to Vattel's Family of Nations, the natives and colonists could have
developed an international law that was mutually binding.
206 See generally BANNER, supra note 189.
207 175 U.S. 677 (1899).
208 See Alfred Brophy, Bradley and Gulati and the Sine Curve of Customary
International Law, THE FACULTY LOUNGE (Jan. 31, 2010, 9:56 PM),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2010/01/bradley-and-gulati-and-the-sine-curve-of-
customary-international-law.html.
209 See id
210 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694-7 10. Like Chief Justice Marshal in
The Antelope and Johnson v. M'Intosh, Justice Gray diligently lays out the historical
justification for supporting the Law of Nations. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543, 572-590 (1823); see also The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114-125
(1825).
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among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago . .. [that]
gradually ripen[s] into a rule of international law. ... He
provided examples of seemingly foolish steps taken by civilized
sovereigns during that history attempting to unilaterally opt out of
established CIL, regarding treatment of private fishing vessels, the
reproach and censure of their civilized neighbors, and their
eventual decision to adhere to CIL.2 12
In Withdrawing, Bradley and Gulati suggested that Gray's
extensive rationalization was necessary to justify a change from
the Default View.213 This premise has been challenged as contrary
to issues of separation of powers and the accepted understanding
in 1899 of the binding nature of CIL.214 An alternative explanation
is Gray's recognition of the need to justify the Court's position
based on stare decisis and to validate "international law. . . [as] a
part of our law" 215 in the midst of growing imperialist and
expansionary fervor in the United States.216 This need becomes
evident when Gray's opinion is juxtaposed against Chief Justice
211 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1899). Justice Gray recounts the
historical application of this particular CIL rule, concerning the capture of small private
fishing vessels, throughout European civilized nations during wartime. Id. at 686-700
(emphasis added).
212 See id. at 689-696. France and Britain seem to have been the greatest offenders
during the wars surrounding the French Revolution with many dramatic pleas made to
the international community to see the travesties of justice inflicted by one or the other.
Id. at 689-92. Napoleon declared that this type of conduct "gave to the existing war a
character of rage and bitterness which destroyed even the relations usual in a loyal war."
Id. at 692.
213 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 215-16 (advancing the premise that previously
nations viewed CIL "as binding only until such time as a nation adequately announced
that it no longer intended to continue adhering to the rule"); see also Luban, supra note
4, at 160 (commenting on Bradley and Gulati's "unsustainable" and "implausible"
interpretation of the holding of The Paquete Habana).
214 See Luban, supra note 4, at 151-52; see also Dodge, supra note 7, at 185.
215 Luban, supra note 4, at 161.
216 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 710 (1899). For example, Justice Gray
intentionally noted that the dicta
[M]ight seem inconsistent with . .. [the court's position of] the duty of a prize
court to take judicial notice of a rule of international law, established by the
general usage of civilized nations. . . . But the actual decision in that case, and
the leading reasons on which it was based, appear to us rather to confirm our
position.
Id.
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Melville Fuller's dissent grounded in the conflicting dicta from
previous opinions.2 17
The Paquete Habana offers insight into dual allegiances that
must be considered by the jurists interpreting international law and
the rationales that must be employed when justifying their
decision to opposing constituencies.2 18 With the pressure to opt
out of the confines of international law mounting in 1899, a
holding that supported previous dicta could have provided an
escape hatch.2 1 9 Rather than confront these larger questions,
however, Justice Horace Gray's stoic approach first returned to the
poor, humble fishermen and how civilized humanity has chosen to
deal with them throughout the centuries. 2 20  Demonstrative of
scholarly support of his position, Chancellor James Kent's quote
sought to shame any "civilized nation" that would "arrogantly set
all ordinary law and justice at defiance ... [by] ventur[ing] to
disregard the uniform sense of the established writers on
international law."221 Echoing the sentiments of Chief Justice
Marshall and quoting Justice William Strong's opinion in The
Scotia,2 2 Justice Gray acknowledged the larger scope of CIL and
its value in the modern world.2 23 Although The Paquete Habana
217 Id. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief Justice Fuller uses dicta
from Chief Justice Marshall to argue that CIL "is a guide which the sovereign follows or
abandons at his will. . . . It is not an immutable rule of law, but depends on political
considerations which may continually vary." Id.
218 See ANGHIE, supra note 130, at 101. "The conundrum presented by this model
of sovereignty that lacks an overarching sovereign who can authoritatively articulate and
enforce the relevant continues to raise the question of why sovereign states obey, or
should obey, international law." Id. (emphasis added); see generally JANIS, supra note
32, at 85 (explaining the conflicting approaches to international law of dualism and
monism).
219 See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). Bradley and Gulati
interpret the quote from Brown to "equat[e] an opt-out pursuant to a unilateral public act
of the government with an "exemption" authorized by a treaty." Withdrawing, supra
note 3, at 225. Nevertheless, the specific context of that quote references an act of
Congress in the initial declaration of war, not a unilateral act post hoc. Professor Dodge
construes "The Paquete Habana's dictum to hold that an act of Congress could
supersede a rule of customary international law." Later-in-Time Rule, supra note 116, at
24.
220 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 687-708 (1899).
221 Id. at 701.
222 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871).
223 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 711. "[B]y common consent of mankind these
2012] 883
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Court could have chosen a de facto application of Bradley and
Gulati's proposal and unilaterally opted out of applying CIL, it
chose instead to honor it.2 2 4
V. A Return to Vattel
Comparing Justice Gray's opinion and Chief Justice Fuller's
dissent in The Paquete Habana reveals the tension that exists
when a system of governance is created based on imperfect
rights. 225  Bradley and Gulati initiated an academic discussion to
"think[] creatively about how to improve [CIL]"2 2 6 by raising
almost the same question posed by Joseph Chitty when editing the
1858 edition of Vattel's treatise: "[O]f what utility is the law of
nations since it is of such imperfect and inefficient obligation?" 2 7
Writing on the eve of vast colonial expansion into uncivilized
nations, Chitty upheld the Law of Nations as "necessary for the
well-being of a society" and as guiding principles "to be consulted
by noble statesmen endeavoring to solve disputes between nations
and around which smaller nations could coalesce against
aggressors." 2 28
rules have been acquiesced in as of general obligation." Id. (quoting The Scotia, 81 U.S.
(14 Wall.) at 187). Explaining one of the manners of formation of CIL via custom,
Justice Gray wrote, "the concurrent sanction of those nations who may be said to
constitute the commercial world" over time results in judicial recognition. Id.; see also
Dodge, supra note 7, at 185-86. But see Mandatory, supra note 12, at 431-33.
224 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 711.
225 VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim., n.21 and accompanying text; see also supra
note 53 and accompanying text. The principles of natural law were resurrected in the
Geneva Conventions, yet the vast difference between what is "wrong" and what is
"illegal" and what falls on either side of the line remains difficult to distinguish.
226 Mandatory, supra note 12, at 421.
227 VA-rEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 34, n.1; see also Paul B. Stephan,
Disaggregating Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 191, 195
(2010) (referencing the lack of a -"mechanism" that imposes an obligation on
international tribunals to interpret CIL in accord with previous interpretations).
228 See VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. § 34, n.1. See e.g., Estreicher, supra note
9, at 59 (noting the merits of CIL to weak states that "lack the means to use self-help
measures to enforces their expectations of appropriate behavior by other states");
Stephan, supra note 227, at 198. Countries with weaker, less developed legal systems
use CIL in times of transition or "as an alternative source of legitimizing norms." Id But
see Age of Treaties, supra note 9, at 9 (questioning whether CIL really does protect
weaker nations since it was originally developed and imposed by dominant Western
powers). The colonization of Africa by the European community was at its zenith
between 1880-1900. See Imperialism in Africa on the Eve of WWI, supra note 145.
884 [Vol. XXXVII
RETURNING TO VATTEL
Bradley and Gulati's advanced their opt out proposal with the
hindsight of the tumultuous twentieth century during which
sovereigns repeatedly instituted, challenged, and rebuked
international law.229 State actions regularly force the global
community to confront questions of the origin and enforceability
of international law. Bradley and Gulati argued that despite
efforts to rebuild, heal, and create prophylactic devices to provide
a peaceful means to address issues and settle disputes within the
international community,23 0 the adaptation of the Law of Nations
to the modern CIL has been ineffective.2 31
Although contrary to traditional notions of reform, returning to
Vattel's multi-faceted conception of international law offers an
innovative approach with the hindsight of history. Emphasizing
international law's "deep[] and veritable roots [of] philosophy,
ethics and religion," 232  Vattel's overarching philosophy and
approach to international relations was arguably less egocentric
and self-gratifying than many modern approaches to international
jurisprudence. 2 33  Therefore, a return to Vattel's model would
require modern sovereigns to adopt the legal principle that
Montesquieu advocated to Napoleon in 1748, "nations ought to do
to one another in peace, the most good, and in war, the least evil
possible."2 34
To return to Vattel, sovereigns must embrace the "[natural
law] principles of justice and humanity applied to all peoples
irrespective of cultural differences" and value the ser humano,
irrespective of race or religion. 235 A return to Vattel would not
229 See, e.g., FINCH, supra note 30, at 28 (quoting German Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg, who said, "This is against the law of nation. . . . The injustice
which we thus commit we will repair as soon as our military object has been attained.").
230 JANIS, supra note 32, at 122-25.
231 See Withdrawing, supra note 3, at 233; see also Mandatory, supra note 12, at
421 (noting CIL's inefficacy in dealing with "nuclear proliferation, global warming, and
international financial stability.").
232 .L. Kunz, The Law of Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 87 (1957).
233 But see Swaine, supra note 15, at 208 (citing various references to critics of
Vattel who claim that Vattel's principles are too abstract and lack substance).
234 See JANIS, supra note 32, at 2.
235 See ANGHIE, supra note 130, at 73; see also Eistricher, supra note 9, at 58 ("CIL
provides a currency, linguistic and otherwise, for negotiating differences that avoids the
language of self-interest").
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include unilaterally opting out of any of these principles-with or
without notice.236 Finally, to return to Vattel, social reproach, fear
of hostilities, and moral conscience must again be enough to
balance the self-interest and political motivations that may cause a
country, especially a powerful country, to resist complying with
CIL.237
VI. Conclusion
Bradley and Gulati contend that "CIL is structurally unable to
address the world's most pressing problems" and have proposed
"allowing for broader withdrawal rights under CIL" such as
allowing countries to unilaterally opt out of CIL with notice.23 8
They seek creative solutions to cure CIL's purported ailments. By
offering "a more sustained historical examination of the
intellectual origins of the Mandatory View,"239 this article
demonstrates the importance of understanding the evolution of
CIL in its historical, philosophical, and legal context and advances
the normative suggestion of returning to Vattel's perspective of
CIL.
Vattel articulated a comprehensive framework of international
law valuing the precepts of natural law and voluntary law while
recognizing their inherent limitations.2 40 He viewed these precepts
236 See Roberts, supra note 11, at 174 (stating Bradley and Gulati's unilateral opt
out proposal is "likely to facilitate opportunistic and abusive claims.... [And it] shift[s]
power from the majority of states to individual states.")
237 KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 141, at 7. This may prove challenging because "[1]ike
any social phenomenon, international law is a complex set of practices and ideas, and the
way we engage in them or interpret them cannot be disassociated from the larger . . .
political projects we have." Id.
238 See Mandatory, supra note 12, at 421, 454. But see Swaine, supra note 15, at
219. There are various forms of international law that are meant to accomplish different
objectives and, therefore, having different withdrawal rights and processes is
appropriate. Id.
239 See Mandatory, supra note 12, at 438.
240 Chancellor Kent espoused a similar view of the interconnectedness of natural
and voluntary law:
The most useful and practical part of the law of nations is, no doubt, instituted
or positive law, founded on usage, consent, and agreement. But it would be
improper to separate this law entirely from natural jurisprudence, and not to
consider it as deriving much of its force and dignity from the same principles of
right reason . . . [binding] every state, in its relations with other states . . . to
conduct itself with justice, good faith and benevolence ....
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as inseparable and fundamental to balancing the disparate needs of
multiple sovereigns living in a confined geographic area and
sharing common resources.
Under Vattel's framework, the Law of Nations functioned
much like a "gentlemen's agreement." Geographic proximity and
the long political history of the civilized countries created
pervasive, binding ties among the Family of Nations. The
gentlemen's agreement valued collaboration over isolation and
rejected unilateral actions designed to benefit one nation at the
potential detriment of another.
During the past two centuries, as our global society has grown
and our Family of Nations has been redefined, applying Vattel's
model has proven challenging. Fortunately, technological
advances and global financial interdependence are arguably
returning our global society to a Family of Nations. Geographic
barriers that once circumscribed civilized and uncivilized nations
are effectively disappearing. Nevertheless, realistically, the
civilized and, thus, equal status of all members is the fulcrum to
successfully reforming CIL based on Vattel's model. Robert
Lansing, U.S. Secretary of State during World War I, wrote that
"[for] an equality among sovereigns to be real [there] must be an
equality of might, otherwise it is artificial, an intellectual
creation."24 If Lansing's cynical analysis is correct, then Vattel's
treatise is only theory and the disparate manner in which the
Supreme Court applied the Law of Nations in The Antelope
(between equal sovereigns) and Johnson v. M'Intosh (between
sovereign and savage) will remain the reality.2 42
Alternatively, if the fundamental, immutable precepts of
natural law transcend geographic and cultural barriers, then
readopting Vattel's unifying approach is plausible. Such a
suggestion will likely draw the same skepticism from politicians
and scholars as Vattel's advancement of natural law principles in
the eighteenth century.243 Or perhaps, "common principles of
FINCH, supra note 30, at 25-26 (quoting CHANCELLOR KENT, I COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 2 (1826)).
241 ANGHIE, supra note 130, at 130 (quoting ROBERT LANSING, NOTES ON
SOVEREIGNTY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE STATE AND OF THE WORLD 65 (1921)).
242 See discussion supra Parts IV.B-C.
243 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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justice and honor"24 4 will offer a palatable alternative to the
discord and dissention that purportedly plague modern CIL.245
Returning to these principles of mutual respect and equal dignity
of sovereigns would reform CIL and promote, rather than impede,
interdependency and cooperation. Unilaterally opting out of these
principles, even with notice, will not promote solutions that
benefit our global society; on the contrary, embracing them may
be a way to bring good to our world.
244 VATTEL, supra note 1, at prelim. §4 n. 1.
245 But see Stephan, supra note 227, at 192-93, 201-02 (citing all the positive uses
of CIL such as "provid[ing] a common ground of discourse among national
bureaucracies" that regulate the military, financial and trade institutions, environmental
regulators, and INTERPOL; and providing an "overlay" to treaties that may "address a
subject but the propositions are framed at a high level of abstraction.").
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